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This article argues that participation is a core element of procedural justice but that there is a 
need to understand better what legal participation means to litigants in court hearings. The 
empirical data on tribunal users’ experiences of participation have underpinned a model of 
legal participation, helping to articulate what procedural justice looks like for this population. 
Using the lens of legal participation developed through this conceptual tool, the article argues 
that the focus on participation as a core element of procedural justice in legal proceedings 
can be used to illuminate the theoretical arguments about what distinguishes courts from 
tribunals. The concept of legal participation, therefore, provides a way to reorient academic 
studies of courts and tribunals to provide a new prism to distinguish justice processes. 
 
Introduction 
The question of what makes a court different from a tribunal remains an open one. The 
difficulty in identifying firm and certain differences is unsurprising given the variety of work, 
roles and processes that apply across the range of courts and tribunals in the UK.  Yet the 
question remains pertinent, both for practical reasons such as administration, economy and 
scale, and principled reasons such as facilitating access to justice and ensuring the best fit 
between legal problems and dispute resolution mechanisms.1  The answer may continue to 
be elusive but there is potential to add some clarity through the lens of legal participation to 
offer a comparative focus on the participative experiences of administrative and employment 
tribunal users and civil court litigants.  
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1 See JUSTICE, What is a court? (2016) available at https://justice.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/JUSTICE-What-is-a-Court-Report-2016.pdf  
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An ability to participate in legal proceedings is a basic facet of access to justice. It is a 
fundamental element of the right under Article 6 of the ECHR to “effective participation” as 
the means of accessing the right to a fair trial,2 but while Article 6 covers most court 
proceedings, some tribunals – such as immigration tribunals – fall outside its scope. 
Participation is also core to the overriding objective in the Civil Procedure Rules3 and the 
Tribunal Procedure Rules4 that govern how courts and tribunals in the UK are run. These Rules 
make it clear that dealing with cases “fairly and justly” means “ensuring … that the parties are 
able to participate fully in the proceedings”.5  The explicit reference here to participation as a 
means of meeting the overriding objective, however, shows that participation is not merely a 
procedural tool but relates to normative perceptions of ‘fairness’ that access to justice 
demands. This assertion is underpinned by the procedural justice literature that evidences the 
desire for fair process as much as favourable outcomes for those using the judicial system to 
resolve their disputes.6 Participation is an intrinsic part of procedural justice. It is inherent 
within the principles articulated by Tyler of voice, neutrality, respect and trust, each of which 
demand some level of participative potential to be realised.7 Procedural justice theory is also, 
helpfully, rooted in a series of studies by Thibault and Walker comparing adversarial and 
inquisitorial procedures, where the procedural justice advantages of an adversarial process 
were seen to outweigh those of an inquisitorial process. Focusing on participation as a core 
element of procedural justice may therefore generate some insight into whether the (clichéd) 
narrative dichotomy of courts-as-adversarial and tribunals-as-inquisitorial is accurate. 
                                                          
2 Article 6 ECHR states that “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”  
3 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998. These rules do not apply to Northern Ireland courts which still operate 
under the County Court Rules (Northern Ireland) 1981, SR 1981/225, Order 58 of which states the 
overriding objective is to deal with cases “justly” and does not explicitly include participation in meeting 
that objective 
4 Section 22 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provides for rules governing the practice 
and procedure of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal, which are made by the Tribunal Procedures 
Committee. The Rules are created by delegated legislation and relate to the different tribunal 
jurisdictions, but the overriding objective is common to each. See for example the Tribunal Procedure 
(First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008 S.I. 2008 No. 2685, rule 2. The majority of 
tribunals in Northern Ireland do not come within the remit of the 2007 Act. The procedural rules here 
for each tribunal are different and do not have the same overriding objective. Proposals put forward in 
2013 by the Northern Ireland Department of Justice for the simplification and standardisation of rules 
across different tribunals have not been implemented: Future Administration and Structure of Tribunals 
in Northern Ireland, available at https://www.justice-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/consultations/doj/tribunal-consultation.pdf [accessed 26 Feb 2019] 
5 Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, Rule 2(c). This 
rule is replicated across other tribunal procedure rules  
6 See for example J Thibault and L Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (1975, Hillsdale); 
E  Lind and T Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (1988, Springer); T Tyler, “Social Justice: 
Outcome and Procedure” (2000) 35 International Journal of Psychology 117; R Moorhead, M Sefton 
and L Scanlan, Just Satisfaction? What drives public and participant satisfaction with courts and 
tribunals? (2008) MOJ Research Series 5/08  
7 T Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the Courts” (2007) 44 Court Review 217 
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The range of ways in which individuals experience the dispute resolution processes that 
culminate in tribunal hearings has been the focus of empirical research with tribunal users.8 
This research established that some tribunal users are fully engaged throughout all, or most, 
stages of the process; some are able to engage at different points but their engagement is 
inconsistent; and some experience considerable barriers that block their ability to participate 
in any or in most aspects of the process. In order to understand these different participative 
experiences a model of legal participation for tribunal users was created to help identify 
participative potential, and gaps, in the user experience.9 What the model reveals is that the 
participative experience is not dictated by a formal classification of a tribunal as inquisitorial 
or adversarial or by its general approach as formal or informal, but by the lived experience of 
delay, legal support, access to information and user expectations. Such features are similar to 
those pursuing disputes in civil courts, suggesting that it may be possible to understand court 
user experiences in terms of legal participation, offering the potential to re-evaluate the 
relative differences between civil courts and tribunals from a user perspective. This paper 
establishes the significance of participation in procedural justice before analysing the existing 
arguments that seek to differentiate courts from tribunals, arguing that while there are 
differences between courts and tribunals, these may not be substantive enough to distinguish 
the adjudicative venues from a participant’s perspective, reinforcing the theoretical analysis 
that differences between lower tier civil courts and administrative and employment tribunals 
are more presumed than real. Reviewing the justifications for these distinctions through the 
prism of participation identifies the extent to which they may be defunct. While participation 
is not the only means by which such distinctions can or should be evaluated, this paper argues 
that the academic study of courts and tribunals should be reoriented towards participation as 
a defining and fundamental feature of dispute resolution, in order to improve our 
understanding of where disputes should sit on an adjudication spectrum to provide 
procedural justice. 
 
Procedural justice and legal participation 
The history of procedural justice traverses the literature of both law and psychology. The 
concept is focused on whether the dispute resolution processes accord with a participant’s 
sense of fairness, which is regarded as a critical factor in generating public trust in the system 
that, in turn, encourages compliance with its rules.10 Fairness in how the legal process works 
                                                          
8 H Genn, B Lever and L Gray, Tribunals for Diverse Users (2006, Department for Constitutional Affairs) 
G McKeever and B Thompson, Redressing Users’ Disadvantage (2010, Law Centre NI); G McKeever, 
Supporting Tribunal Users (2011, Law Centre NI).  
9 G McKeever, “A Ladder of Legal Participation for Tribunal Users” (2013) Public Law 575 
10 See for example, E Barrett-Howard & T Tyler, “Procedural Justice as a Criterion in Allocation 
Decisions” (1986) 50 Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 296; T Tyler, “What is Procedural 
Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures” (1988) 22 Law & Society 
Review 103; E Lind, R Kanfer, & P Christopher Garley, “Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: 
Instrumental and Non-instrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments” (1990) 59 Journal of Personality 
& Social Psychology 952; T Tyler, Why people obey the law (1990, Princeton University Press); E Lind & 
P Earley, “Procedural Justice and Culture” (1992) 27 International Journal of Psychology 227; L Solum, 
“Procedural Justice” (2004) 78 Southern California Law Review 181; T Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the 
Courts” (2007) 44 Court Review 217 
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and in the legal norms that are applied to particular cases has long been a feature of legal 
philosophy and jurisprudential inquiry. It is most obviously associated with Rawls’ Theory of 
Justice, in which he defines different forms of procedural justice that have the potential to 
generate a sense of distributional fairness.11 In social psychology, however, Thibaut is widely 
regarded as one of the leading writers on procedural justice and his early empirical work with 
Walker demonstrated the role of procedural justice in relation to legal processes, establishing 
the need for legal systems to comply with perceptions of fairness as part of the social contract 
between citizens and state.12 The principles by which procedural justice could be achieved 
were articulated by, most notably, Leventhal,13 and then Tyler,14 with each overlapping the 
other. Tyler’s work has guided much recent thinking on procedural justice within the legal 
system and sets out four principles. First is voice, which provides individuals within the court 
system the opportunity to tell their story and to be heard. Second is neutrality, based on the 
need for legal processes to be transparent, consistent, open and capable of being explained 
and understood.15 Third is respect, in which individuals are seen as being important and 
valuable and are taken seriously within the process.16 Fourth is trust, where the focus is on 
whether participants are being listened to and their views considered by honest actors.17 
One of the core attributes of procedural justice is its ability to influence the attitudes of those 
who use or are subject to the justice system.  Greenber and Folger describe the ‘fair process 
effect’ that sees procedural justice as a synonym for ‘fair’, where this fairness and attendant 
sense of legitimacy establishes and maintains public confidence in the legal system.18  Solum 
makes the case for a “participatory legitimacy thesis” that sees adjudicative procedures as 
creating legal norms which (like other norms) require rights of participation to establish 
legitimacy.19 In this way, Solum aligns participation with normative legitimacy, not just 
psychological acceptability, further acknowledging that “a right to participation in decision-
                                                          
11 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971, Harvard University Press), in which Rawls distinguishes between 
three general kinds of procedural justice: (1) "perfect" procedural justice, (2) "imperfect" procedural 
justice, and (3) "pure" procedural justice. 
12 J Thibault and L Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (1975, Hillsdale) 
13 G Leventhal, “What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in 
Social Relationships”, in K Gergen, M Greenberg and R Willis (eds) Social Exchange (1980, Springer). 
Leventhal’s work explores the limitations of ‘equity theory’ and articulates not just the principles of 
procedural justice but six rules which govern it: (1) consistency, (2) bias suppression, (3) accuracy, (4) 
correctability, (5) representativeness and (6) ethicality 
14 T Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the Courts” (2007) 44 Court Review 217 
15 Leventhal also identified voice and neutrality as principles of procedural justice: G Leventhal, “What 
Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships”, 
in K Gergen, M Greenberg and R Willis (eds) Social Exchange (1980, Springer) 
16 This principle reflects an identity based view of procedural justice, relating back to Leventhal’s 
principle of status recognition: G Leventhal, “What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New 
Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships”, in K Gergen, M Greenberg and R Willis 
(eds) Social Exchange (1980, Springer); See also J Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 
(1985, Yale University Press) for an articulation of the dignitary value of procedural justice  
17 Again, there are overlaps here with Leventhal’s work and the principle of benevolence: G Leventhal, 
“What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social 
Relationships”, in K Gergen, M Greenberg and R Willis (eds) Social Exchange (1980, Springer)  
18 J Greenberg and R Folger, “Procedural Justice, Participation and the Fair Process Effect in Groups and 
Organizations”, in P Paulus (ed), Basic Group Processes (1983, Springer-Verlag) 
19 L Solum, “Procedural Justice” (2004) 78 Southern California Law Review 181, 275 
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making processes is valuable because it respects the dignity and autonomy of those who are 
affected by the outcome of those processes.”20 
The role of participation within procedural justice is not contested (either in the literature or 
this article) but the concept of participation is itself complex. Participation is generally 
understood as the ability of individuals to have a say in decisions that affect them. The nature 
of the participative experience, however, is largely dictated by the power and knowledge that 
the participant has, or is given. Where the power is withheld by the decision maker, then 
participation is a futile or tokenistic gesture towards inclusive decision making. Where power 
is shared, participation becomes a genuine partnership that enables all voices to be heard and 
to have weight. Procedural justice demands that the participant in the legal process is heard, 
respected and considered as part of the decision making process, but what is not clear from 
the literature is how this participation can be assessed as having met the principles of voice, 
neutrality, trust and respect.   
What may be instructive here is the model of legal participation, based on empirical research 
with tribunal users, that captures the different types of participative experiences within the 
dispute resolution processes that culminate in a tribunal hearing. This model, derived from 
Arnstein’s seminal model of participation,21 categorises the forms of participation ranging 
from those forms in which the user feels isolated within the legal process through to those 
forms in which the user feels enabled (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: McKeever’s ladder of legal participation 
Each of the rungs on the ladder defines a form of participative experience, characterised by 
the extent to which the individual faces intellectual, practical or emotional barriers to 
participating. The more significant the barriers, the lower the rung of participation. The 
                                                          
20 L Solum, “Procedural Justice” (2004) 78 Southern California Law Review 181, 263 
21 S R Arnstein, “A ladder of citizen participation” (1969) Journal of the American Planning Association 
216 
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bottom rung is isolation, where the individual feels excluded and alone within the dispute 
resolution process, either because they do not want to participate, or see their participation 
as futile. Segregation is where users feel segregated from the official dispute resolution 
process or secondary within it, since the process is designed for the benefit of decision makers 
and power holders rather than for those who need to use the system to access their rights. 
Further up the ladder, tokenistic forms of participation include obstruction of the user’s 
progress through the dispute resolution process. This can take the form of referral fatigue, 
the provision of inaccurate or incomplete information by decision makers which inhibits or 
obstructs the user’s knowledge, or through delays in resolving the dispute. Placation occurs 
where decision makers provide assistance that does not fully assist users. Critically, this can 
include situations where users have access to advice and/or representation that is of poor 
quality and masks the intellectual, practical and emotional barriers to participation that may 
remain.  The top three rungs relate to experiences where there is greater evidence of effective 
participation. Engagement exists where users are able to navigate successfully through the 
dispute resolution process and communicate with its actors so that the user understands 
everyone’s role and position within the process.  Collaboration exists where users are 
supported in their efforts to join decision makers in a co-operative venture. Finally, being 
enabled reflects the efforts made by tribunal actors to empower users to understand and 
present their case in a meaningful way. Advice and representation may be critical to securing 
participation, where good representation is not just about ensuring a successful outcome of 
the user’s dispute, but also about ensuring that users have an effective voice within the legal 
process that relates to their social world. 
Understanding fairness, legitimacy, dignity and democracy as part of procedural justice 
demands a fuller understanding of the user’s participation. While this understanding has been 
advanced in relation to tribunals, this has not involved a comparative focus on understanding 
participation in relation to courts although this may well facilitate a better understanding of 
differences between courts and tribunals. There have been numerous attempts to identify the 
differences and similarities between civil courts and tribunals, but they are worth revisiting in 
light of this analysis of participation.  
 
The differences between courts and tribunals? 
The decision as to whether dispute resolution lies with a court or a tribunal is not one made 
by the user, but rather one made by the legal system. Fuller’s examination of adjudication 
questions whether “the ‘essence’ of adjudication lies in the mode of participation it accords 
to the affected party” or “in the office of judge.”22 The litigant’s role is simply to navigate the 
particular part of the system where her dispute has been housed. It remains an empirical 
question whether litigants can participate more effectively depending on whether the judge 
determining their case is attached to a court or a tribunal. It seems reasonable, based on a 
long-standing structural separation of courts and tribunals, to hypothesise that the 
adjudicative venue creates a different participative experience, but the merger of courts and 
                                                          
22 L Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) Harvard Law Review 92(2): 353, 365 
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tribunals into a single agency in different parts of the UK calls such structural distinctions into 
question.23  
The 2001 Leggatt review of tribunals that preceded this merger identified three features that 
would distinguish whether a dispute should be decided by a tribunal rather than a court.24 The 
first was participation: tribunal users would be able to present their own cases “if helped by 
good-quality, imaginatively presented information, and by expert procedural help from 
tribunal staff and substantive assistance from advice services”, whereas court litigants would 
expect to participate through an advocate.25 The second was the need for specialist expertise 
to inform tribunal decisions, which could be provided by the tribunal members, as distinct 
from the civil courts which rely on expert opinion and evidence produced by the parties. The 
third was expertise in administrative law, requiring consideration to be given within any new 
regulatory scheme as to whether a right of appeal is required and what that might look like, 
recognising that the remedy of judicial review is expensive and difficult. Recent developments 
in courts, tribunals and administrative decision-making processes suggest that these clear 
distinctions are worth re-examining. 
 
Expertise in administrative law 
Leggatt’s third criterion – of expertise in administrative law – appears the most unassailable. 
Adjudication of legal entitlements arising from often technical regulations was the one of the 
purposes for which tribunals were first developed,26 and the growth in the number and remit 
of administrative tribunals has inevitably generated considerable administrative law 
expertise. It is also clear that the appeal courts have been deferential to the tribunals whose 
decisions are under appeal, on the basis of this expertise.27 Yet there are cracks in this 
argument, at least at the Upper Tribunal (UT) level. As Elliott and Thomas explain, the caseload 
of the Administrative Court in England and Wales has increased significantly over recent years, 
                                                          
23 Broadly speaking, in Britain, the merger of courts and tribunals resulted in the creation of Her 
Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS), while in Northern Ireland the merger resulted in the 
Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service. This broad picture is complicated by the fact that the 
geographical jurisdictions of different tribunals vary. Most tribunals within HMCTS are England, or 
England and Wales only. The Immigration tribunal is the only UK-wide tribunal, while Northern Ireland 
and Scotland have their own tribunals relating to devolved powers, and there are five Welsh tribunals 
which hear challenges to decisions made by Welsh public bodies. 
24 Sir A. Leggatt, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service, (2001, TSO) para.s 1.11-13 
25 Sir A. Leggatt, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service, (2001, TSO) para 1.11 
26 Sir O Franks, Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (1957, Lord Chancellor's 
Department) 
27 See E Jacobs, Tribunal Practice and Procedure (2016, LAG) para.s 1.132-1.146. One of the most striking 
examples of this deference was in the House of Lords decision in Hinchy v Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions (2005) UKHL 16, in which their Lordships reinstated the decision of the Social Security 
Commissioner, overruling the Court of Appeal. Lord Hoffman, giving the judgment, stated that the 
Court of Appeal’s decision amounted to a “rejection of the principles developed and applied by the 
Commissioners over a number of years” and that this was problematic as the Commissioners “have 
practical experience of the day-to-day working of the benefit system and ... the principles they have 
devised to give effect to the legislative scheme dealing with overpayments are entitled to great 
respect.” (para.s 28-29) 
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creating “delays and an evident desire for the court to focus its limited resources.”28 One of 
the court’s responses to this problem was to transfer some of the judicial review caseload to 
the UT.29 The decision to allocate such hearings to the UT is not because the Administrative 
Court lacked expertise, or because the participative experience was likely to be qualitatively 
different, but simply for efficiency purposes, reverting back to the original motivation for the 
creation of tribunals: to keep a review of regulatory regimes from clogging up court based 
reviews of other types of everyday problems.30  
The drive for efficiency in legal process is entirely legitimate, but it is not clear whether 
tribunal efficiency is a cause or effect: are tribunals efficient because they deal only in one 
legal specialism, or is their administrative expertise the reason why they are efficient? 31  In 
practical terms the distinction may be irrelevant, but as a reason for distinguishing between 
courts and tribunals, it may be that the difference Leggatt attributes to courts and tribunals is 
more mutable than he suggests. This may be particularly so under the new modernisation 
programme being advanced by HMCTS, where the move to online dispute resolution will 
require a fresh look at “the challenges in translating legal process values – transparency, 
fairness, participation, judicial independence and open justice – to the digital sphere.”32 One 
of the most critical tasks in matching legal and technological expertise to the legal problems 
of individual citizens will be the impact on participation and procedural justice.33 Such 
challenges – yet to be fully understood – will apply equally across tribunals and courts and 
may themselves reveal as many similarities as differences between the relative efficiencies 
and expertise of each.  
 
Specialist expertise 
Specialist expertise in tribunals may relate to the legal expertise of tribunal judges or the 
expertise provided by non-legal members on relevant evidential issues such as finance, health, 
employment or education. Despite this, however, specialist expertise in tribunals is often 
accessed through expert evidence – for example, written and oral testimony relating to 
functional capacities or special educational needs – just as it is in courts, and tribunal judges 
                                                          
28 M. Elliott and R. Thomas (2012) “Tribunal Justice and Proportionate Dispute Resolution” Cambridge 
Law Journal 297, 302 
29 See R. Thomas and J. Tomlinson, Immigration Judicial Reviews: an empirical study (2019; University 
of Manchester) 
30 Efficiencies in transferring juridical reviews to the Upper Tribunal may also flow from the fact that 
judicial salaries in the Upper Tribunal are typically lower than in the Administrative Court. Mullen makes 
the overall point that tribunals have lower unit costs per case than courts in large part because of the 
proportionally greater use in tribunals of fee-paid chairs/judges as opposed to salaried judges: T Mullen, 
“A Holistic Approach to Administrative Justice?”, in M Adler (ed) Administrative Justice in Context (2010, 
Hart: Oxford), 399 
31 J Tomlinson and B Karemba  (2019) “Tribunal Justice, Brexit, and Digitalisation: Immigration Appeals 
in the First-tier Tribunal” Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 33: 47-65  
32 R Thomas and J Tomlinson, “Remodelling social security appeals (again): the advent of online 
tribunals” (2018) Journal of Social Security Law 84, 98-99 
33 R Thomas and J Tomlinson, The Digitalisation of Tribunals: What we know and what we need to know 
(2018, Public Law Project). See also M Federman, “On the Media Effects of Immigration and Refugee 
Board Hearings via Videoconference” (2006) Journal of Refugee Studies 19: 433; IV Eagly, “Remote 
Adjudication in Immigration” (2015) Northwestern University Law Review 109: 933 
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can – and do – sit alone in some cases, without the specialist input of expert panel members. 
It must also be accepted that tribunal expertise “is … not a given fact, but something to be 
demonstrated – principally through the quality of a tribunal's decisions and reasons.”34 
Additionally, as Cane argues, although the civil courts have a wide jurisdiction it is also the 
case that “individual [civil court] judges may specialise in particular areas of law, such as 
intellectual property”.35 This mirrors the expertise acquired by tribunal judges. A further 
reflection between the courts and the new tribunal system established following Leggatt’s 
review is the cross-ticketing of tribunal members. The high caseload of immigration judicial 
reviews that resulted in moving cases from the Administrative Court to the Upper Tribunal 
also resulted in social security judges from the Administrative Appeals Chamber being drafted 
in to assist with the caseload. This suggests that – like their court colleagues – the legal 
expertise of tribunal judges can be wide as well as deep. The value of distinguishing between 
courts and tribunals on this basis therefore appears limited. 
 
Participation 
Differences in the nature and extent of participation between courts and tribunals, however, 
may be substantial. Gaze and Hunter’s research, for example, examines the different 
adjudicative experiences of federal anti-discrimination claimants in Australia.36 Complainants 
alleging discrimination under Australian federal law were able to bring their complaints to the 
Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (HEROC) through a relatively 
informal tribunal hearing where HEROC would make an adjudicative determination.37 
However, the implications of an Australian High Court decision meant that HEROC was 
judicially defined as an administrative tribunal, and thus unable to make binding decisions on 
federal anti-discrimination matters.38 The solution to this disempowerment of the tribunal 
was to shift the adjudication of federal anti-discrimination matters from HEROC to the federal 
courts, the consequence of which was an increase in the formal and intellectual barriers for 
litigants in resolving their disputes, leading to a significant change in the claimants’ experience 
of adjudication. One of the difficulties of applying this example to the UK, however, is that 
Australian tribunals are different from UK tribunals – they are categorised as executive rather 
than judicial bodies – and so the participative distinction found by Gaze and Hunter may be 
specific to that jurisdiction.39 Whether this means that there will be participative differences 
between all or other courts and tribunals therefore remains a live issue, and one that empirical 
research could illuminate. 
                                                          
34 M. Elliott and R. Thomas (2012) “Tribunal Justice and Proportionate Dispute Resolution” Cambridge 
Law Journal 297, 318 
35 P Cane, Administrative Law, (2011, Oxford University Press) 320 
36 B Gaze and R Hunter, “Access to justice for discrimination complainants: courts and legal 
representation” (2009) UNSW Law Journal 699. 
37 HEROC was the predecessor body to the Australian Human Rights Commission  
38 Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245. 
39 P Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (2010, Hart). See also Groves, who examines the 
duty to inquire in Australian administrative tribunals and questions whether even these tribunals are 
inquisitorial in any true sense of the term, despite an arguably greater requirement to be so: M Groves, 
“The Duty to Inquire in Tribunal Proceedings” (2011) 33 Sydney Law Review  177 
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It is reasonable to expect that litigants should be able to participate in court processes, 
especially when assisted by effective information, expert court staff and good quality pre-
hearing advice, just as Leggatt envisaged in his normative model for tribunal hearings.  Yet the 
normative tribunal model does not reflect the reality: tribunals may now be more enabling 
but there will still be tribunal users who remain unable to participate, despite progress here.40 
Similarly, the hope that courts could be sufficiently inquisitorial to enable all litigants to 
participate also appears limited. Research on unrepresented litigants in civil and family law 
cases makes it clear that there are limitations on the ability of the judge to assume an 
inquisitorial role to ensure their participation.41  Some litigants will require more support than 
an inquisitorial court process could provide, in much the same way as some tribunal 
participants may require additional support beyond that offered by the tribunal to overcome 
their participative barriers.42  
This begs the more fundamental question of whether there is such a thing as an inquisitorial 
process within the UK legal system. Thibault and Walker’s ground-breaking research on 
procedural justice that compared adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems was based on a 
comparison of the American and French legal systems, rather than a comparison of different 
adjudicative procedures within the same legal system.43 The American and the French legal 
systems are entirely different, effectively invalidating the adversarial/inquisitorial 
distinction.44  It is perhaps more accurate to view UK courts and tribunals as existing on an 
adjudication spectrum, at one end of which Jolowicz identifies the “theoretically pure 
adversary system” while at the other end is the “theoretically pure inquisitorial” process.45  
Most court procedures are positioned towards the adversarial end of the spectrum (especially 
those encountered in the higher courts). The court system is designed to test the evidence in 
a case through the presentation of opposing arguments by plaintiffs and defendants, with 
                                                          
40 Adler’s research highlights the value of pre-hearing advice but in the context of tribunals becoming 
more enabling: M. Adler (2009) “Tribunals ain’t what they used to be” Adjust Newsletter, available at 
http://ajtc.justice.gov.uk/adjust/articles/AdlerTribunalsUsedToBe.pdf. The tribunal participation 
model demonstrates that not all tribunals are enabling and not all tribunal users are able to participate. 
41 G McKeever, L Royal-Dawson, E Kirk and J McCord, Litigants in Person in Northern Ireland: Barriers to 
Legal Participation (2018; Ulster University); L Trinder, R Hunter, E Hitchings, J Miles, R Moorhead, L 
Smith, M Sefton, V Hinchly, K Bader and J Pearce, Litigants in Person in Family Law Cases (2014, MOJ 
Analytical Series) 
42 See for example AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 
1123 in which Sir Ernest Ryder, Senior President of Tribunals, makes clear the tribunal’s duty to ensure 
that the appellant is able to participate effectively in the hearing, to ensure that proceedings are fair 
and just, as required by the overriding objective in rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) 
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 and rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) 
Rules 2008  
43 J Thibault and L Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (1975, Hillsdale).  
44 The central plank of this argument is that the adversarial system privileges the opportunity for 
disputants to explain their positions, where the inquisitorial system limits this opportunity by not 
making explicit provision for the disputants to put their evidence forward  
45 J. A. Jolowicz, “Adversarial and inquisitorial models of civil procedure” (2003) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 281. See also T Mullen, “A Holistic Approach to Administrative Justice” in 
M Adler (ed) Administrative Justice in Context (2010, Hart) 
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such arguments then weighted and adjudicated by the judge.46 Both Fuller and Zuckerman 
regard the adversarial presentation as only way that the “natural human tendency” towards 
confirmation bias can be overcome.47  In Zuckerman’s analysis there is no alternative model 
for courts, and he dismisses the “myth” of an inquisitorial system: 
“If by inquisitorial process one means a process in which the court of its own initiative 
decides how to define the issues, what evidence should be called, tests such evidence 
and investigates the conflicting allegations by considering arguments for and against, 
then no such procedure is in operation today in any advanced system.”48 
The empirical evidence would certainly indicate that tribunal processes do not correspond to 
this mythical inquisitorial approach, most recently indicated in relation to immigration 
tribunals where judges were observed to adopt a variety of approaches across the 
adjudication spectrum, by no means limited to an inquisitorial tradition.49 Indeed, Thomas’ 
analysis indicates that tribunals have adopted an adversarial approach as their default 
position,50 and merely, as Mullen describes it, “applied an inquisitorial gloss to a basically 
adversarial process.”51  
Whether such a “theoretically pure inquisitorial” process exists is therefore open to debate, 
but a related debate is whether the “theoretically pure adversarial system” is also a myth 
today. Jolowicz notes the demise of adversarial purity as a result of changes in English 
procedural law: those that require the judge to be familiar with the skeleton arguments, 
witness statements, and expert reports before the case is heard; the increased judicial powers 
under the Civil Procedure Rules to control the evidence in the case; and the increased focus 
on persuading litigants to settle their disputes outside the court.52 In Cane’s view, courts and 
tribunals stem from the same skeleton of the Civil Procedure Rules, with the result that “[i]n 
terms of procedure and modes of operation, courts and tribunals are similarly diverse, ranging 
                                                          
46 This point is also made by Owusu-Bempah in relation to criminal courts in England and Wales, which 
she argues can no longer be characterised as adversarial, creating a departure from legal norms, 
resulting in compulsory ‘active’ (as opposed to ‘passive’) participation by defendants in criminal trials 
in breach of their rights under Article 6 ECHR: A Owusu- Bempah, Defendant Participation in the 
Criminal Process (Routledge: 2018) 
47 L Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 353, 383; A. 
Zuckerman, “No justice without lawyers – the myth of an inquisitorial solution” (2014) Civil Justice 
Quarterly 355-374, 356 
48 A. Zuckerman, “No justice without lawyers – the myth of an inquisitorial solution” (2014) Civil Justice 
Quarterly 355-374, 356. See also Groves, who argues that “it is widely accepted that an extreme version 
of either [an inquisitorial or adversarial model is undesirable and that no country adopts a pure or full 
version of either.”: M Groves, “The Duty to Inquire in Tribunal Proceedings” (2011) 33 Sydney Law 
Review  177, 181 
49 R. Thomas and J. Tomlinson, Immigration Judicial Reviews: an empirical study (2019; University of 
Manchester) 
50 R Thomas, “From ‘adversarial v inquisitorial’ to ‘active, enabling and investigative’: developments in 
UK administrative tribunals”, in L Jacobs and S Baglay (ed.s) The nature of Inquisitorial Processes in 
Administrative Regimes: Global Perspectives (Ashgate: 2013) 61 
51 T Mullen, “A Holistic Approach to Administrative Justice?”, in M Adler (ed) Administrative Justice in 
Context (2010, Hart: Oxford), 391.  
52 J. A. Jolowicz, “Adversarial and inquisitorial models of civil procedure” (2003) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 281, 286-288. 
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from the very formal and adversarial to the much less formal and inquisitorial.”53 Once again, 
the empirical evidence would tend to bear this out. Research on litigants in person in the civil 
and family courts revealed a variety of judicial behaviours in their adjudication techniques, 
some of which were clearly in the more adversarial tradition while others adopted a more 
inquisitorial approach to help determine the relevant facts to be adjudicated, indicating that 
the spectrum of adjudication is evident in both settings.54 Thomas argues that (for tribunals) 
the language of adversarial/inquisitorial is redundant, and should instead be replaced by 
concepts of active adjudication.55 This blending of the position of courts and tribunals on the 
adjudication spectrum does, however, reinforce the problem of establishing whether there 
are any differences between courts and tribunals.  
The regulation of administrative schemes was the original reason for the creation of tribunals, 
and may still be a justifiable basis for distinguishing courts from tribunals, but beyond this – 
and despite Leggatt’s clear characterisation of some distinguishing features – arguably there 
is as much common ground here as distinctiveness between courts and tribunals. More 
significantly for this paper, if the logic that underpins the differentiation of expertise and the 
categorisation of courts-as-adversarial and tribunals-as-inquisitorial is flawed, then we must 
also question whether the participative experiences of court and tribunal users are different. 
If we accept the premise of an adjudication spectrum, empirical evidence places tribunals, not 
just courts, towards the adversarial end of that spectrum. If this is the case, then a logical 
consequence may be that the participative experiences of court litigants will be similar to 
those of tribunal users, as indicated by research on the participative barriers for litigants in 
person in the civil and family courts.56  At the very least, what this opens up is the potential 
for participation to be the lens through which differences between courts and tribunals can 
be examined. 
 
Participative links between courts and tribunals 
The continued drive towards the modernisation of the courts and tribunals system – the 
digitalisation of justice, the creation of a unified judiciary and the construction of an integrated 
courts and tribunals service – alongside divergence in process, with the greater use of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in administrative justice decision making, for 
example57 – means that it is important to question whether there is still any mileage in the 
traditional distinction between courts and tribunals. Equally important, however, is how that 
                                                          
53 P Cane, Administrative Law, (2011, Oxford University Press) 320 
54 G McKeever, L Royal-Dawson, E Kirk and J McCord, Litigants in Person in Northern Ireland: Barriers 
to Legal Participation (2018, Ulster University); L Trinder, R Hunter, E Hitchings, J Miles, R Moorhead, 
L Smith, M Sefton, V Hinchly, K Bader and J Pearce, Litigants in Person in Family Law Cases (2014, MOJ 
Analytical Series) 
55 R Thomas, “From ‘adversarial v inquisitorial’ to ‘active, enabling and investigative’: developments in 
UK administrative tribunals”, in L Jacobs and S Baglay (ed.s) The nature of Inquisitorial Processes in 
Administrative Regimes: Global Perspectives (Ashgate: 2013) 61 
56 G McKeever, L Royal-Dawson, E Kirk and J McCord, Litigants in Person in Northern Ireland: Barriers 
to Legal Participation (2018, Ulster University) 
57 See R Thomas and J Tomlinson, The Digitalisation of Tribunals: What we know and what we need to 
know (2018, Public Law Project). 
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question is answered. There are many criteria by which courts and tribunals can be compared 
including the nature of representation, the availability of legal aid, the cost to the parties, the 
formality of the proceedings and the time frame for resolving disputes.58 Further exploration 
of each of these would prove insightful in understanding any distinctions or similarities 
between courts and tribunals, building a more holistic understanding of how disputes should 
be categorised and dealt with by the legal system. Comparative empirical data will continue 
to illuminate the theoretical discussions on the changing landscape of justice but there is also 
a need to underpin this with a understanding of what the values of a justice system should be. 
 
Participation – as a core element of procedural and substantive justice and of legal values 
embedded in procedural rules – offers the potential to understand the legal landscape from 
the user’s perspective and to bring to bear the principles and experiences that users value. 
The intellectual, emotional and practical barriers that dictate the nature of legal participation 
provide a realistic starting point that can also encompass issues of representation, 
accessibility and formality – as existing empirical data illustrates – that can enable a better 
understanding of whether the traditional court-versus-tribunal distinction remains 
worthwhile. 
 
Intellectual barriers identified by the tribunal-based model of legal participation seem equally 
relevant for court users. These barriers impact on an individual’s ability to prepare for and 
follow the hearing and relate to the user’s inability to create the foundations for a factual and 
legal narrative of their case, to understand the significance or the role of documentation, or 
to know what constitutes relevant information. In both court and tribunal settings, we know 
that the terminology or language used by judges and lawyers can act as an intellectual barrier 
that blocks participation which, in the language of the legal participation model, leave users 
isolated or segregated within the legal process.59 The role of representation is identified in the 
tribunal model as having the potential to remove participative barriers but poor 
representation can create additional barriers by failing to empower individuals to make 
informed decisions about their own cases, and masking the lack of understanding that 
tribunals might otherwise seek to overcome. Given the disadvantages faced by litigants in 
person in representing themselves in court, it would be easy to draw the conclusion that legal 
representation will enable effective participation, but this is not something that can be 
assumed. Evidence from litigants in person is that one of the reasons for self-representation 
is a dissatisfaction with legal representatives who are not seen as giving voice to the litigant 
                                                          
58 See for example the report by JUSTICE that rejects the court/tribunal distinction in favour of ‘justice 
spaces’ with the recommendation that the determination of the most appropriate justice space should 
be driven by “the characteristics and demands of the particular case to be heard, including: the level of 
security risk posed by the proceedings; the need for formality and/or solemnity; the anticipated degree 
of public participation; whether participants in the proceedings consent to the judicial process and; the 
extent to which parties may need to be segregated.”: What is a court? (2016), p 3, available at 
https://justice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/JUSTICE-What-is-a-Court-Report-2016.pdf 
59 See for example N Balmer, A Buck, A Patel, C Denvir and P Pleasence, (2010) Knowledge, Capability 
and the Experience of Rights Problems Research Report (Plenet, Legal Services Research Centre: 2010); 
P Pleasance and N Balmer, How people resolve ‘legal’ problems (Legal Services Board: 2014); R Blakey, 
“Family mediation after LASPO: the accessibility and relevance of public information” (2018) 48(8) 
Family Law 1057-1061 
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and therefore block their participation.60 Beyond this, the variation in judicial interventionism 
which can assist or compound intellectual barriers is exposed in both tribunal- and court-
based empirical research and offers further potential to see whether participants in these 
legal processes regard the systems as distinct.61  Putting this alongside the increasingly 
defunct distinction between adversarial courts and inquisitorial tribunals suggests that the 
role of legal representation from a participation perspective provides a valid means of 
understanding commonalities and differences between courts and tribunals.62   
 
Practical barriers to participation are those that relate to the legal venue, procedures and 
documentation: from not knowing how and where to obtain relevant documentation to more 
mundane issues of not knowing what building, or part of the building, the hearing will be in, 
hindering practical and psychological preparation by users. The evidence of individual citizens 
struggling with overcoming practical barriers to resolve their disputes is significant, and on 
this issue there is no obvious distinction between court and tribunal user experiences. A focus 
on whether practical barriers are distinctive for tribunal or court participants also seems 
relevant in light of the burgeoning literature on the physical architecture of the courtroom 
that can “marginalise participatory justice”.63 Where there is a physical separation of a court 
litigant from their representative and the judge, the potential for isolation (as a type of 
participation) becomes a product of how the litigant’s needs are ignored.64 The literature on 
the design and architecture of courts testifies to this point.65 Lawyers sit or stand before the 
judge at the front of the court, with their backs to the litigants who must sit at the rear of the 
courtroom on the public benches. This practical barrier of being physically far removed from 
their lawyers prevents any intervention in the proceedings. While the tribunal research 
involved proceedings where users and their representatives sat together with equal proximity 
to the tribunal judge, the increased use of courtrooms for tribunal hearing may undermine 
any distinction here, where the architectural structure underpins the dominance of lawyers 
                                                          
60 G McKeever, L Royal-Dawson, E Kirk and J McCord, Litigants in Person in Northern Ireland: Barriers to 
Legal Participation (2018, Ulster University), p 88 
61 For evidence of the interventionist approach by judges with litigants in person see G McKeever, L 
Royal-Dawson, E Kirk and J McCord, Litigants in Person in Northern Ireland: Barriers to Legal 
Participation (2018, Ulster University); L Trinder, R Hunter, E Hitchings, J Miles, R Moorhead, L Smith, 
M Sefton, V Hinchly, K Bader and J Pearce, Litigants in Person in Family Law Cases (2014, MOJ Analytical 
Series). The adoption of a more interventionist approach in research on immigration tribunals this was 
a key finding: R. Thomas and J. Tomlinson, Immigration Judicial Reviews: an empirical study (2019; 
University of Manchester) 
62 While there has not been the equivalent rise in the LIP population in NI as in England and Wales,  
research in NI showed that dissatisfaction with, or lack of trust in lawyers was a reason why 
individuals choose to self-represent: G McKeever, L Royal-Dawson, E Kirk and J McCord, Litigants in 
Person in Northern Ireland: Barriers to Legal Participation (2018, Ulster University), pp 87-88 
63 L Mulcachy, “Architects of Justice: the Politics of Courtroom Design” (2007) Social and Legal Studies 
16(3): 383, at 398. See also P Carlen (1976) Magistrates’ Justice, London: Martin Robertson 
64 L Mulcachy, “Architects of Justice: the Politics of Courtroom Design” (2007) Social and Legal Studies 
16(3): 383  
65 M Rossner, D Tait, B McKimmie and R Sarre “The dock on trial: courtroom design and the presumption 
of innocence’ Journal of Law and Society (2017) 44 (3): 317; E Rowden, A Wallace, D Tait, M Hanson, M 
and D & Jones, Gateways to Justice: Design and Operational Guidelines for Remote Participation in Court 
Proceedings (University of Western Sydney: 2013); L Mulcachy, “Architects of Justice: the Politics of 
Courtroom Design” (2007) Social and Legal Studies 16(3): 383; P Carlen (1976) Magistrates’ Justice, 
London: Martin Robertson 
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and judges at the expense of other participants.66 Finally, concerns about the practical barrier 
to participation of the time required to attend legal proceedings can help illuminate the 
impact of how courts and tribunals compare in the way that hearings are scheduled, 
structured and supported, with tribunals more frequently allocated to blocks of time within 
the same day, week or month, while court processes take a more staggered approach, with 
successive hearings over longer periods of time. 
 
Emotional barriers to participation arise from the lack of familiarity with attending legal 
proceedings as well as concerns around the process and outcome of the hearing. This lack of 
knowledge about what to expect relates clearly to the emotional challenge of understanding 
how to behave in such an unfamiliar environment, where power imbalances are present. 
There is no reason to assume that court litigants will be better able to manage this than 
tribunal users, given the empirical evidence on the emotional impact of issues such as family 
disputes and personal bankruptcy.67 There is clearly potential value in comparing the 
participative barriers across different areas and divisions of court work, which could deepen 
the analysis of which, not just whether, courts generate similar participative experiences to 
which tribunals.  
 
A further distinct barrier that was not evident in the tribunal studies has emerged from 
research on litigants in person in civil and family courts, which is the attitudinal barrier. This 
was a general frustration voiced by judges, lawyers and court staff that those who were 
representing themselves were ill-equipped to do so; that the adversarial court system was 
premised on the requirement that litigants would be represented and those who appear 
without representation are in breach of this legal norm, with consequent negative results for 
the system.68 While some administrative tribunals such as social security frequently encounter 
unrepresented parties – both state and appellant – and are less likely to see such 
arrangements as an aberration, more lawyer-heavy tribunals such as employment and 
immigration may experience more of an imbalance where unrepresented parties appear,69 
aligning them more closely with courts than other tribunals. As online dispute resolution 
becomes a more integral part of administrative justice, and as reductions in legal aid 
(particularly notable in England and Wales) make legal advice and representation less 
accessible in areas covering both court and tribunal expertise, the expectation that users will 
be represented has the potential to evolve considerably, further eroding not just traditional 
distinctions between courts and tribunals but the nature of legal participation and the need 
to understand barriers to participation in this new landscape. 
 
                                                          
66 Greater rationalisation of the court estate throughout the UK has led to some tribunal hearings taking 
place in courtrooms, with tribunal centres being closed 
67 G McKeever, L Royal-Dawson, E Kirk and J McCord, Litigants in Person in Northern Ireland: Barriers 
to Legal Participation (2018, Ulster University) 
68 G McKeever, L Royal-Dawson, E Kirk and J McCord, Litigants in Person in Northern Ireland: Barriers 
to Legal Participation (2018, Ulster University) 
69 G McKeever and B Thompson, Redressing Users’ Disadvantage: Proposals for Tribunal Reform in 
Northern Ireland (Law Centre NI: 2010) 
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Should there be a distinction between courts and tribunals? 
This article has argued that the user experience of courts and tribunals is not dictated by the 
formal categorisation of each, and that the historical assumptions of differences between 
courts and tribunals are not borne out by empirical research on how individual citizens 
experience the relative formality, procedures, legalism, and the adversarial or inquisitorial 
approaches of each venue. For those who use courts and tribunals – particularly where they 
do so without legal or specialist support – other values and characteristics may be prioritised, 
including the ability to participate effectively in the proceedings so that the outcome is 
meaningful and understood. Leggatt recognised that the perspective of the tribunal user was 
critical and his review of tribunals rationalised administrative justice through the concept of 
citizen redress, rather than through the traditional institutional distinctions of complaint or 
appeal. The Commission on Justice in Wales has taken this rationalisation further, stating that 
there is a need to unify civil courts and tribunals, pointing to the example of housing law where 
the different ways in which dispute resolution spans both venues is argued to be illogical.70 
The argument that civil courts and tribunals should be unified has its attractions, though it is 
clear that it not without problems.71 Chief among these is that there remain critical differences 
between civil and administrative justice. Genn defines civil justice as a public good, and as a 
system of social and economic importance that balances efficiency with substantive justice.72 
The administrative justice system is defined by Adler as “[t]he principles that can be used to 
evaluate the justice inherent in administrative decision-making.”73 While both are clearly 
fundamental to the rule of law,74 critically, administrative justice is broader than just tribunals. 
Structurally, administrative justice extends to courts and tribunals as well as public bodies, 
ombudsmen, commissioners, statutory complaint handlers, politicians and advice service 
providers.75 Conceptually, however, administrative justice is intended to be preventative and 
remedial as well as procedural. In this conceptualisation, individual forms of dispute 
resolution within administrative justice serve the dual purpose of justice with accountability 
– individual citizens holding public bodies and their decision-makers to account for their 
actions – and consequentially improving public administration. The outcome should be that 
public bodies are not just required to make the right decision (or rectify the wrong one) but 
have the opportunity to learn and improve, benefiting all citizens and improving efficiency.76 
As Cane explains: 
                                                          
70 Commission on Justice in Wales, Justice in Wales for the People of Wales (2019) para.5.56 
71 See for example S Nason (ed), Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative Perspectives (2017, 
University of Wales); T Mullen, T Mullen, “A Holistic Approach to Administrative Justice?”, in M Adler 
(ed) Administrative Justice in Context (2010, Hart: Oxford) 415-417 
72 H Genn, Judging Civil Justice (2009, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge) 
73 M Adler, “A Socio-Legal Approach to Administrative Justice” (2003) 25 Law and Policy 323 
74 See for example the report by the Commission on Justice in Wales that identifies (at at para.6.1) the 
Rule of Law requirement that individuals can challenge decisions made by public bodies, alongside the 
emphasis that inhibiting citizens’ access to civil justice imperils the Rule of Law (at para.5.11): Justice in 
Wales for the People of Wales (2019) 
75 S Nason, Understanding Administrative Justice in Wales (2015, Bangor University), 6 
76 There are numerous different models of administrative – or bureaucratic – justice, that represent the 
different trade-offs required by public administration systems, balancing the values of public 
administration with legal values: see J Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (1983, Yale University Press: New 
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“improving the quality of administrative decision-making goes beyond not only the … 
idea that accountability may perform a normative function, but also what Mashaw 
calls ‘the management side of due process’ – the idea that ex ante recruitment 
practices, training programmes, management techniques and internal monitoring are 
at least as important as ex post scrutiny of individual decisions in raising and 
maintaining bureaucratic decision-making standards.”77  
Arguably, therefore, the broader impact (or potential for such) of individual tribunal decisions 
underlines the greater public need for effective participation – and the distinctive value that 
participation can bring.  
While there are values common to each, there is also a need to understand tribunals and 
courts on their own terms and where there are differences or similarities these should be 
justified rather than assumed. The increased judicialization of tribunals and the increased 
complexity of procedural rules may not so much be evidence of convergence but the drivers 
of this. There are, of course, lessons that tribunals and courts can learn from each other and 
multiple lenses through which these can be viewed. For tribunals, the lens of public 
administration, focused on distributive justice, expediency, efficiency and informality, is 
balanced against the lens provided by legal values such as openness, fairness, rationality and 
impartiality that are equally common to courts. But the lens of participation offers something 
substantive and additional. A better understanding of legal participation reveals the flaws 
underpinning some of the assumptions around both tribunals and courts, revealing instead a 
spectrum of adjudication where some courts may be more participative than some tribunals, 
and vice versa. The challenge is not to allocate the space on the spectrum according to the 
label but to understand the participative potential of each venue, justifying why participation 
may be different rather than asserting that it is or ought to be so. This should not remove the 
distinction between the fields of civil and administrative justice but provide the impetus to 
justify normative models and frameworks for each. Mullen identifies the principled reasons 
why tribunals should be more accessible – more participatory – as a way of assessing when 
legal representation should be provided to tribunal users.78 Such reasons sit equally well in 
understanding when litigants should be provided with legal representation for court hearings, 
but instead of proxies of vulnerability based on education or socio-economic background, an 
empirically informed understanding of how individuals participate could be used, driven by 
the necessity in courts and tribunals to ensure effective participation. 
Participation gives us an insight into the degree and possibility (including the benefits) of 
convergence between courts and tribunals. It may well result in a convergence leaning 
towards the tribunalisation of courts, led by the participative learning and implications for 
tribunals.79 Whatever the outcome, there is a need to add participation to the rationale for 
                                                          
Haven; M Adler (ed) Administrative Justice in Context (2010, Hart: Oxford), chapters 6, 7 and 8. Some 
of these will prioritise user experience, while others will elevate other core elements, with those coming 
closest to prioritising participation arguably being Mashaw’s judgement model, Adler’s consumerist 
model and Halliday and Scott’s egalitarian model. 
77 P Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (2010, Hart: Oxford) 212-213 
78 T Mullen, “A Holistic Approach to Administrative Justice?”, in M Adler (ed) Administrative Justice in 
Context (2010, Hart: Oxford) 415 
79 JUSTICE, Understanding Courts (2019) para.s 2.60-2.61 
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allocating particular disputes to particular justice processes. This does not displace the other 
means of distinguishing between various justice processes, but recognises that participation 
is as valid a consideration and is a way to improve how dispute resolution venues of all kinds 
can work for those who use them. Participation is a value common to both courts and 
tribunals, underpinned by Article 6, that should not be ignored in either setting. 
 
Conclusion 
Fairness in legal process demands that the affected citizen is able to participate effectively: to 
be adequately informed about critical choices, to trust that a neutral arbiter will enable their 
engagement and hear their voice, and therefore to be able to exert influence on the outcome 
of the proceedings. Such participation is not merely concerned with litigant satisfaction but 
with legal legitimacy. Consequently, the requirement for participation is not confined to either 
courts or tribunals, but should apply equally to both since the choice of whether a dispute is 
resolved in court or tribunal is one that is not open to the citizen, but determined by the state. 
This point is recognised in the different procedural rules that govern the majority of courts 
and tribunals in the UK, which locate full participation as central to the overriding objective to 
deal with cases fairly and justly.  
 
While the principled argument on the value of participation may be accepted, there remains 
a difficulty with knowing whether the outcome of participation has been achieved in a way 
that meets the principles of procedural justice or the core legal standard of effective 
participation under Article 6 ECHR. A model of legal participation, derived from the empirical 
evidence on tribunal user experience, helps articulate what legal participation is and what the 
barriers are in enabling user participation. This model also helps bring into focus the long-
standing question on what distinguishes a court from a tribunal. If participation is required in 
both legal arenas, understanding whether there is something different about the barriers that 
tribunal users face compared to court litigants can help us understand what makes a court 
different from a tribunal. In his review of the tribunal system, Leggatt was clear that tribunals 
were distinct and different from courts: on the basis of their expertise in administrative law, 
the specialist expertise inherent within the tribunal; and in the capacity for tribunals to enable 
user participation without legal representation, where the default assumption for court 
litigants was that representation and participation were inextricably linked.  
 
An examination of these grounds of purported differences, however, shows that what Leggatt 
defined as distinct approaches are now much less discrete to one venue over the other. 
Instead, the allocation of disputes on the basis of administrative expertise (and efficiency) is 
no longer confined only to tribunals, as the sharing of court and tribunal expertise on 
immigration demonstrates. Equally, the argument on the uniqueness of specialist expertise of 
tribunal panel members has weakened, in part through the reforms instigated by Leggatt’s 
recommendation that tribunal members could be cross-ticketed across different tribunal 
jurisdictions, much as their court counterparts are in courts, while at the same time the 
potential for deep judicial expertise in courts becomes more evident. Most critically, perhaps, 
is the increasingly redundant stereotype of courts-as-adversarial and tribunals-as-
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inquisitorial, with the mythology of adversarial and inquisitorial purity ruptured by the 
variation in judicial approaches across courts and tribunals. 
 
The de-bunking of myths and the adaptations of judicial practice and legal process underline 
not just the evolution of courts and tribunals but the convergence of their approaches to 
dispute resolution. The academic arguments, however, should be moved on and the question 
of what makes a court different from a tribunal needs to be examined empirically from the 
perspective of court and tribunal users. The existing work on the participative barriers faced 
by tribunal users has provided a foundation on which further empirical evidence is being built, 
to examine participative experiences of court litigants.80 While this provides important insight 
into how participative barriers for litigants in person mirror those faced by tribunal users, 
there remains significant potential to use the lens of legal participation to investigate whether 
a court or tribunal experience is sufficiently different for the citizen to justify distinguishing 
whether their case is attached to a court or a tribunal. If participation is to be protected as a 
core value of the justice system, as mandated by article 6 ECHR, by the principles of procedural 
justice and by most of the procedural rules by which courts and tribunals are bound, then 
understanding what legal participation means to court and tribunal users remains vital. This 
critical need also provides the opportunity to explore more fully the differences between 
courts and tribunals, and stimulates the potential for the justice system to evolve in ways that 
provide coherent protection for citizens, allocating disputes based on where the greatest 




                                                          
80 Research funded by the Nuffield Foundation to take forward the examination of participation by 
litigants in person in family courts is being conducted by G McKeever, L Royal-Dawson, J McCord and 
M Potkewitz at Ulster University (2019-2021) 
